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Before Russia began its aggression against Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia had felt a higher level of security due to their membership 
in NATO and the EU. This has now changed. The authorities of these states claim that 
Russia has been pursuing an aggressive policy towards them for a long time, using 
various instruments of pressure. They claim that Russia is now able to organise acts of 
sabotage against them in several areas and that these could threaten both their internal 
stability and the territorial integrity of the region. The Baltic states’ reaction to the threat 
from Russia has demonstrated that the level of cooperation between them is low. It has 
also revealed certain weaknesses in several areas of how these states function, which 
Moscow may be willing to use for its own purposes. Paradoxically, this has created a 
chance for the Baltic states’ governments to take measures which in different political 
circumstances would meet with resistance from society, such as strengthening the 
military sector and the level of energy security. 
From economic pressure to a weakening sense of security 
Russia has for years been trying to maintain its influence in the Baltic states, which is 
still present in a number of areas, from politics to the economy. Whenever aimed at 
gaining control over the transit and energy infrastructure, Russia’s actions in this respect 
have been aggressive in nature. Resource blockades have been applied, an excessive 
price of gas has been used, attempts have been made to corrupt political elites (by 
fostering cooperation between them and Russian business circles) and a permanent 
presence of Russian special services was maintained. The Baltic states’ economic and 
infrastructural ties with Russia impeded their ability to integrate with Western Europe 
quickly. Political elites in the three Baltic states were balancing between the official pro-
Euro-Atlantic course and attempts at maintaining the benefit of economic cooperation 
with Russia. By joining NATO and the EU in 2004 the Baltic states gained the impetus to 
intensify measures focused on re-orienting their economies. Financial support from the 
EU has enabled them to take measures – to varying degrees and unfortunately not in 
step with each other – to increase the independence of their energy sectors.  These 
sectors are crucial in the Baltic states’ relations with Russia due to their resource 
dependence. 
The weakening of the sense of security in the Baltic states was inspired by the riots in 
Tallinn (in the spring of 2007) involving the Russian minority which supported the protest 
made by the government of Russia concerning the planned removal of the monument to 
the soldier of the Soviet Union (the so called “Bronze Soldier”) from its location in Tallinn. 
At the same time, a cyber-attack was staged which paralysed the key aspects of the 
functioning of the Estonian state, although special services never managed to prove that 
Russia had been the external aggressor. After the 2007 cyber-attack, in 2008 Estonia 
created a Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in its territory under the auspices of NATO 
(although outside of NATO’s structures). The Baltic states’ sense of security diminished 
further as a result of Russia’s use of military power against Georgia in the summer of 
2008 and its recognition of the independence of the breakaway territories. Also in 2008 
President Dmitri Medvedev expanded the Russian Federation’s foreign affairs doctrine to 
include clauses allowing Russia to unilaterally defend its citizens and business interests 
beyond its borders. This was received by the Baltic states as a signal that Moscow might 
be interested in taking more active measures to increase its influence in these countries. 
The annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in Ukraine have aggravated these 
fears, especially in the context of the intensification of Russia’s propaganda campaign 
targeted at the Baltic states, which are perceived as enemies of Russia who are violating 
the rights of Russian citizens. This campaign accompanied Russia’s acts of aggression 
against the Baltic republics. The propaganda was further strengthened by Russia’s 
demonstration of its military power, which included: the Baltic Fleet exercises, the 
intensification of reconnaissance missions carried out by Russia’s military aircraft, and 
the violation of the Baltic states’ air space. 
Russia also used other measures to spread terror among the Baltic states’ population. It 
announced that the Russian judiciary would reinstate criminal responsibility for 
Lithuanians who deserted the Soviet Army after 1990 when Lithuania regained 
independence. In September a Russian ship took a Lithuanian trawler over by force which 
had been fishing for crabs in the international waters of the Barents Sea, and towed it 
away to Murmansk. However, the incident which has most strongly influenced the social 
mood and which reinforced the popular belief that Russia would be willing to escalate the 
tensions in the Baltic region was the abduction of an Estonian intelligence officer from 
the territory of Estonia to Russia and accusing him of espionage[1]. The incident took 
place on 5 September 2014, immediately after President Barack Obama’s visit to Tallinn 
and during the NATO summit in Newport. All these actions were intended to create the 
impression that, regardless of their membership in the Western alliances, the Baltic states 
are weak and unable to guarantee security to their citizens. 
  
Common challenges to security 
Currently, the cooperation between the Baltic states has been visible mainly at the level 
of EU institutions and NATO, where their policies have been largely convergent. The 
historical experience connected with their relations with Russia has still been their 
strongest common element. It has inspired a clearly negative assessment of Russia’s 
policy, and this is sometimes perceived by the Baltic states’ Western allies as being 
excessively anti-Russian and non-constructive in the context of attempted diplomatic 
dialogue between the West and Russia. 
In their bilateral relations with Russia the Baltic states have maintained considerable 
differences resulting mainly from their divergent political and economic interests. This 
has been impeding regional integration and deepening the distrust between them. Within 
the three societies (and the political parties which represent their interests) a polarisation 
of opinions has been visible – from extreme nationalism to pro-Russian attitudes. This 
makes it difficult to devise a uniform policy both of individual states and of the entire 
region. 
The Baltic states’ fears are focused on two issues – the escalation of hostile actions by 
Russia, and NATO’s preparedness to grant the Baltic republics support within the alliance. 
Although a direct military attack from Russia is still considered unlikely, the possible 
hybrid war remains an important challenge for the Baltic states. In a hybrid war the 
aggressor achieves its goal by using means which do not activate NATO’s collective 
defence measures. For Russia, one such goal is to weaken the position and the credibility 
of the Baltic states’ ruling elite – both domestically, and internationally. One of the tools 
in this policy involves influencing the election results by fuelling social tensions, mainly 
within the Russian minority, and compromising the current elites in the public sphere. 
Another goal which Russia has is to disturb investments which threaten the interests of 
Russian companies and business – by influencing the economic and energy policy, using 
economic and energy blockades, or even by destroying energy, port and transit 
infrastructure. In the security sphere, Russia’s goal is to counteract the attempts at 
strengthening NATO’s military presence in the three Baltic states, to sustain the fear that 
a confrontation between the forces of NATO and Russia could take place in their territory, 
and to weaken the trust which the states of NATO have in the Baltic states’ political elites 
and services. 
Preparations for a possible hybrid war 
The United States, the Baltic states’ strategic ally in the area of security, has repeatedly 
criticised the low level of defence spending in Lithuania and Latvia. Estonia joined in the 
criticism; as the only country whose defence budget corresponds to the NATO standard 
of 2% of GDP (US$ 479 million in 2013)[2] it claims the right to accuse its Baltic partners 
of impeding the defence cooperation with NATO. Meanwhile, in Latvia (with its defence 
budget amounting to 0.9% of GDP, US$ 291 million) and Lithuania (0.8% of GDP, US$ 
354 million) the defence investments have been reduced due to spending cuts introduced 
as a result of the economic crisis. The lack of consensus within political elites over the 
issue was also evident. It was eventually reached in both countries only when the threat 
posed by Russia grew stronger. It seems that by 2020 Lithuania and Latvia will also 
increase their defence budgets to 2% of GDP, which will help maintain a high level of 
NATO’s military involvement in the Baltic region and guarantee the continuity of NATO 
exercises in the Baltic states’ territory, already underway for several months now[3]. The 
changes have already been evident in the level of defence spending planned in the 2015 
state budgets – Lithuania’s spending is expected to reach US$ 518 million (1.11% of 
GDP), Estonia’s should reach US$ 512 million (2.05%), and Latvia’s US$ 315 million 
(1%). 
The authorities of Estonia have assessed the FSB’s abduction of the Estonian officer as 
an act of aggression, an element of a hybrid war. NATO consultations pursuant to Article 
4 were considered. In the context of other cases of illegal crossing of the border (on the 
Narva River), including by two Russian former KGB officers, Estonia took measures to 
unilaterally demarcate the border so that it would be clearly visible and could be properly 
monitored, making it more difficult for Russia to repeat similar provocative actions in the 
future. Latvia has also been forced to unilaterally demarcate its border, as Russia has 
refused to cooperate on this issue. 
Estonia prepared a new draft national defence law with its focus on new challenges in the 
security sphere, both in peacetime and during war[4]. It provides for the role of the prime 
minister and the government to be strengthened in managing the state’s defence, and is 
intended to facilitate the decision-making process concerning emergency situations. It is 
scheduled to come into force on 1 January 2016. Lithuania has also joined in the 
preparations for a possible hybrid war. The law on the use of arms in peacetime has been 
drafted as a new legal solution[5]. Should foreign military troops appear on Lithuanian 
territory the country’s president would be entitled to sign a decree introducing martial 
law. In connection with the opinion shared by the Lithuanian government that the 
potential aggressor can be deterred by the country’s preparedness for defence alone, 
Lithuania managed to create its own rapid response forces within several months. As part 
of these plans, Lithuania decided to maintain the combat readiness of approximately one 
third of its permanent ground military personnel as from 1 November 2014[6]. The task 
of these troops is to react to all types of provocative acts, including nationalist-motivated 
conflicts, attacks of groups of armed individuals wearing unmarked uniforms, foreign 
soldiers infiltrating Lithuania via the border, the violation of military transport procedures, 
as well as certain threats emerging in neighbouring countries. The decision to create this 
formation was motivated not only by fears that the process of building the NATO 
spearhead[7] might be prolonged, but also by the willingness to demonstrate to NATO 
that Lithuania is ready to take greater responsibility for its own security and that of the 
region. In the debate on the creation of rapid response forces, the importance of 
territorial defence units has been emphasised, including voluntary units operating locally 
– these are considered more effective in estimating the level of threat in its initial phase. 
The problem, however, involves the fact that the regions where the proportion of national 
minorities is the largest are: the Polish minority (Vilnius region) and the Russian-speaking 
minorities (Visaginas, Narva, Riga and Daugavpils) and that these would be the most 
vulnerable to the outbreak of a hybrid war. In this case the territorial defence units would 
have to be composed of representatives of exactly those minorities which the authorities 
do not trust. 
The debate has also focused on the reform of the army itself. Only Estonia has retained 
compulsory military service and regular military training. Lithuania has been attempting 
to replace conscription  with the training of volunteers whose numbers have risen 
considerably in recent months in all three Baltic states. The level of advancement of the 
volunteers’ training is not comparable with that of the regular reserves. Regardless of the 
level of training and equipment of the Baltic armies, the number of soldiers in active 
military service (11,800 in Lithuania, 5,300 in Latvia, 5,700 in Estonia) and the reserves 
(6,700 in Lithuania, 7,800 in Latvia, 30,000 in Estonia)[8] is still too small, which is why 
the issue of a possible return to conscription in Lithuania and Latvia has been the subject 
of recent debates. 
Estonia’s specialisation in cyberspace defence has inspired other states to try to identify 
their own specialisations which could serve as their contribution to the cooperation with 
NATO, but also a response to the needs of the region. In 2013 Lithuania opened its NATO 
Energy Security Centre of Excellence and in 2014 Latvia established the NATO Strategic 
Communications Centre of Excellence to focus also on Russia’s soft power in the 
communications space. Lithuania and Estonia have made their air force bases available 
for the purposes of the NATO Baltic Air Policing mission – in Šiauliai and Ämari. In the 
context of NATO’s increased operational presence in the Baltic Sea, Latvia has offered to 
adapt the post-Soviet military port in Liepāja along with the nearby airport to serve as 
NATO’s sea base for the purpose of actions it carries out in the region. The port, itself a 
Latvian navy base, has already been used by NATO troops. The decision concerning this 
base, however, will prove more difficult than the previous ones, because account must 
be taken of certain threat factors such as the possible resistance on the part of local 
groups supporting Russia’s policy. Today, ca. 40,000 Russian-speaking people live in 
Liepāja, one quarter of whom hold Russian citizenship. They receive financial support 
from local Russian business circles and the embassy. 
Allies of the Kremlin and Russian propaganda 
To revive Russian propaganda Moscow has re-activated its lobby in the Baltic states. This 
action is aimed at challenging the policy of these states and to weaken their citizens’ level 
of trust. The Baltic states are unable to fully neutralise these influences, therefore certain 
groups and individuals supporting the Kremlin’s policy and interests operate officially in 
the public sphere. Their activity was evident right from the first stage of the Ukrainian-
Russian conflict. The mayor of Tallinn and leader of the Centre Party Edgar Savisaar 
warned against the results of sanctions and joined Riga’s Russian mayor, Nil Ushakov, in 
attempting to persuade society of the economic benefits resulting from the cooperation 
with Vladimir Putin’s administration. The mayor of the Latvian town of Ventspils, Aivars 
Lembergs, joined in the criticism of NATO’s military presence (seen as the presence of 
an occupying army) in the territory of the Baltic states. He attempted to spread terror 
among the town’s residents, claiming that Latvia might become a battlefield in the 
confrontation between the USA and Russia. Criticism has also been voiced in relation to 
the dubious position taken by Latvia’s president Andris Bērziņš, who refrained from 
condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine and even reiterated his invitation for president 
Putin to visit Latvia. 
In the opinion of the governments of the Baltic states Russia has been waging an 
information war against them for many years now, and has also exerted economic 
pressure. On 7 October 2014 the Lithuanian Seimas rejected the amendments to the act 
on the media, submitted by President Grybauskaitė. The amendments involved a 
restriction of the retransmission of Russian broadcasts and introduced a requirement for 
at least 90% of the broadcasts retransmitted in Lithuania to be aired in the official EU 
language versions. The Baltic media are not only unable to fight Russian propaganda, 
they in fact support it indirectly by neglecting certain other information areas. The 
problems of the region have not been covered by the local media which, if anything, 
prefer to inform the public of the particularly shocking scandals which occur in 
neighbouring countries. This prevents the building of common interests and mutual trust 
among the three states. Similarly, the Baltic states have failed to reach an agreement on 
the establishment of a common TV station to broadcast in Russian in order to combat 
Russian propaganda. Consequently, the operation of Russian television has been 
temporarily limited in Lithuania and Latvia. In Estonia it has been decided that such 
limitations are ineffective, because Russian propaganda spreads via satellite TV and the 
Internet. Nonetheless, in early January 2015 Estonia joined the initiative proposed by the 
foreign ministers of Lithuania, the United Kingdom and Denmark, calling for the European 
Commission to adopt a common EU action plan to counteract Russian propaganda. 
The Baltic states have devoted a lot of energy to monitoring the mood within the Russian-
speaking minority in Estonia and Latvia and within both the Polish and Russian minority 
in Lithuania. The popularity of the Russian media helps sustain a positive opinion of 
Putin’s policy among the Russian-speaking population[9]. The Latvian Security Police has 
observed an increase in the number  of Internet users whose task is to create the 
impression that large groups within Latvian society, including in particular the Russian-
speaking population, support Russia’s policy and oppose the presence of US and NATO 
troops in the region. 
The tensions between the minorities and the governments have continued to exist, 
relating to issues such as the naturalisation policy in Latvia and Estonia, the right to speak 
the minority language and to receive tuition in the case of the Polish and Russian minority 
in all three states. The situation in Ukraine can be considered as a warning for the 
minorities. Today, the potential for organising protests in the form of mass 
demonstrations and riots, similar to those staged in the past in Latvia (concerning the 
restriction of education opportunities for minority groups) and in Estonia (the relocation 
of the Bronze Soldier), is much smaller, although the demands have remained the same. 
The awareness of the difference in the standards of living in the EU and Russia contributes 
to limiting the radicalism within the minorities and weakens separatist tendencies, which 
is also confirmed by representatives of local communities. Despite the sense of 
marginalisation within society, the majority of the Russian-speaking residents of Estonia 
and Latvia have already been granted citizenship of their states and enjoy civil rights 
(including the right to vote); also in Lithuania Poles have actively participated in the 
country’s political life. The governments of the Baltic states, however, prefer to monitor 
the activities of the minorities, including using the special services, and are even 
considering further limitations (for instance in the field of education), rather than engage 
in an active dialogue concerning their rights. Currently, the nationalist tendencies within 
Baltic societies, fuelled by the increased threat from Russia and the persistent conviction 
that the minorities have no loyalty towards the state, have been impeding the chances 
to overcome the tensions and the ethnic division within Baltic societies. 
The difficult economic ties with Russia 
The governments of the Baltic states have been reluctant to comment on the results of 
Russia’s embargo on foodstuffs imported from the EU, announced in August 2014 in 
response to EU sanctions which the Baltic states support. Attempts have been made to 
expand the list of Russian citizens banned from entering the EU and no support has been 
granted to demands voiced by the influential farmers’ lobby in these states to be granted 
compensation by the EU. For the Baltic states, the embargo has been equivalent to the 
loss of an important export market (agricultural produce: dairy products, processed meat, 
vegetables) and revenues from the transfer of goods. For Lithuania and Estonia, Russia 
is the main export destination with 16% of total exports, whereas for Latvia it is the 
second largest export market with 11%. The greatest losses will be suffered by Lithuania: 
in 2013 the value of goods subject to the export embargo to Russia amounted to EUR 
910 million, which equates to 2.6% of Lithuania’s GDP and 3.7% of total exports. In the 
case of Estonia and Latvia the losses amounted to, respectively, EUR 72 and 67 million 
(0.4 and 0.3% of GDP), i.e. 0.6% of either of the countries’ exports volume[10]. No quick 
reorientation of the directions of exports or change in the production profile is possible, 
although the authorities have been making such attempts[11]. The Baltic transport 
companies handling the export of goods to Russia, as well as sea ports, have also suffered 
certain losses; the Lithuanian port of Klaipėda, which mostly handles the transit of goods 
to Belarus, has been relatively least affected. In spite of the necessary correction of GDP 
growth forecasts, the rate of economic growth in the Baltic states has continued to be 
one of the highest in the EU; currently, the EU’s leader in this respect is Lithuania with 
2.8%, whereas for Latvia the figure is 2.4%, and for Estonia 1.7%[12]. The exports losses 
have been offset by increased level of domestic consumption and investments, which has 
resulted from the inflow of remittances by expatriate workers. 
When introducing the embargo Russia did not use the full spectrum of possibilities of 
targeting the economic interests of the Baltic states. For example, the export of canned 
sprats has not been blocked (this would have particularly affected Latvian exporters). It 
is likely that Latvia may also become the target of other actions – the Russian processed 
oil exporting companies have announced that in January a decision will be taken to 
continue or terminate their cooperation with the ports in Riga and Ventspils (excluding 
the export of Russian coal, however). Were Russia to stop the transit of goods via this 
country (cargo from Russia accounts for as much as 80% of foreign goods transit via 
Latvia) this would contribute to a sharp drop in the revenues generated by the Latvian 
ports and railways. Russia would also have to exert influence on Belarus and other 
countries of the Eurasian Economic Union to discontinue their cooperation with the Baltic 
ports, Klaipėda in particular. 
In the context of the events in Ukraine, energy security has again become a key issue, 
and the argument quoting the high costs of limiting energy dependence on Russia has 
lost some ground. For many years, energy independence for the Baltic states has been a 
very distant prospect. Energy has been one of the most significant areas of the Baltic 
regional cooperation – shared use of the local infrastructure and the development of 
electrical energy and gas exchange markets could guarantee the region’s independence 
and integrate the Baltic markets with other EU energy markets. For this to be possible, 
the Baltic states would have to unify their energy policies and shape their relations with 
Russia in a convergent manner. Meanwhile, only Lithuania has managed to launch 
multilevel measures to reduce its energy dependence on Russia, in spite of resistance 
from pro-Russian groups slowing down this process. The key element of Vilnius’s strategy 
has been the implementation of the Lithuanian LNG terminal project[13], completed in 
December 2014. The prospect of a diversification of gas supplies will considerably change 
energy cooperation in the Baltic region where, so far, Gazprom has not only been shaping 
the prices, but also using its gas monopoly as an instrument of economic and political 
pressure. Estonia too seems to be determined to increase its independence. However, its 
key projects – the LNG terminal and the pipeline crossing the Gulf of Finland – depend to 
a large extent on its cooperation with Finland, which so far has been rather difficult. The 
authorities of Latvia, where Gazprom’s position has been the strongest, have focused on 
negotiating favourable terms for long-term cooperation with Gazprom rather than 
achieving energy independence. The fear of Russia increasing its economic pressure 
might delay the implementation of the EU’s Third Energy Package in Latvia. The supplier 
of the fuel (Gazprom) and the Russian-Latvian company Itera are currently in control of 
the transit and distribution activities. They have also been involved in granting access to 
the only gas storage facility in the region located in Latvia, and without free access given 
to third parties no free gas trade market can be created in the Baltic states and the 
process of breaking the economic ties between the Baltic republics and Russia may be 
halted. 
  
Conclusions 
Russia has demonstrated that in the territory of the Baltic states it is able to carry out 
acts of sabotage which these states are not prepared for and which they will have 
difficulty responding to due to the low level of regional cooperation, the lack of mutual 
trust and the halted transformation in areas such as the economy, social policy, energy 
and the defence sector. The fear of losing sovereignty is currently present in Baltic 
societies and the local political elites have used this as an argument in favour of taking 
the most difficult and socially unpopular decisions such as increasing military spending 
or carrying out costly energy projects which might contribute to the improvement of 
security but which also pose an economic risk. The lack of real partnership between the 
Baltic states prevents them from uniting their potentials to counteract Russia’s influence 
and pressure. 
If the limitations on Baltic exports are sustained, the distrust of Russia as a trade partner 
will grow, which in turn will force Baltic producers to seek permanent cooperation with 
other markets. This would not be a long lasting process, though. 
A propaganda war intended to weaken any uniform position of the region’s states and to 
sustain the relations with pro-Russian political and economic circles, has been under way 
for a long time and has recently gained momentum. A key element of this war has been 
the skilful fuelling of conflicts within society over ethnic issues and challenging the level 
of trust in the state and its institutions. The fear of radicalism on the part of Russians or 
Poles may inspire the governments of the Baltic states to continue to limit the rights of 
minorities, which – combined with the ongoing Russian propaganda – may finally lead to 
a more violent outburst of disappointment. This, in turn, might become a pretext for 
Russia to launch an intervention. 
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